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The Impact of Local Decentralization on Economic Growth: 
Evidence from U.S. Counties 
 
We analyze the impact of fiscal decentralization on U.S. county population, employment, and 
real income growth. Our findings suggest that government organization matters for local 
economic growth, but that the impacts vary by government unit and by economic indicator. 
We find that single-purpose governments per square mile have a positive impact on 
metropolitan population and employment growth, but no significant impact on 
nonmetropolitan counties. In contrast, the fragmentation of general-purpose governments per 
capita has a negative impact on employment and population growth in nonmetropolitan 
counties. Our results suggest that local government decentralization matters differently for 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Countries around the world, particularly transition economies, have gone through 
a significant decentralization of their government structures in recent decades. 
Decentralization is generally defined as the transfer of certain administrative and fiscal 
functions or powers of a central authority to several local authorities.  The main 
advantage of local decentralization is that local governments are more efficient (or at 
least as efficient) at providing certain public services compared to the higher levels of 
government (Oates, 1972).  On the other hand, the theoretical literature in this area argues 
that there are limits to decentralization and points to an optimal level of fiscal federalism.  
Some of the limiting factors are listed as tax-benefit linkages, positive spillovers 
(externalities) of local public goods to neighboring communities and economies of scale 
involved with the production of the local public good.  For example, there is thought to 
be a trade-off between better treatment of positive externalities through a centralized 
decision making and loss of local accountability (Oates, 2008).  
Arguments for the benefits of decentralization and certain empirical evidence led 
to a widespread decentralization trend particularly among transition economies.  While 
the U.S. is generally more decentralized compared to most of the developed countries and 
the OECD average, there is a distinct trend towards more centralization in the U.S. states 
since 1970 (NCSL, 1997; Brunori, 2003).
1  The main culprit for this trend is the 
diminished reliance on property taxes in local financing.  There is also a recent 
movement towards consolidation of certain types of local governments. A recent example 
of this is the recent merger between the city of Louisville and Jefferson County in 
Kentucky which was approved in a referendum in 2000.  There are also talks about   2
possible mergers or public service consolidations in Pittsburgh-Allegheny County 
(Pennsylvania), Reno-Sparks (Nevada), Buffalo and other locations in upstate New York.  
Similar consolidations were proposed in West Virginia after recommendations by the 
West Virginia Commission on Governing in the 21
st Century.  These different 
decentralization trends highlight the importance of examining empirically the links 
between decentralization and certain economic outcomes, particularly economic growth. 
In this paper, we examine the relationship between local decentralization and 
growth using data from metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties in the U.S. In contrast 
to the previous literature that has focused on metropolitan statistical areas, we use 
counties as our geographic unit of analysis. This is important, since counties (and lower 
levels of government) are often the governmental units with the power to fragment or 
centralize, either in terms of the number of government units or in terms of revenue 
generation. This contrasts with metropolitan statistical areas, which usually do not 
conform to political jurisdictions. We argue that it is important to include 
nonmetropolitan counties in the analysis since, as Hammond and Thompson (2008) and 
Higgins et al. (2006) have shown, metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions differ 
significantly in their responses to growth determinants. Thus, including nonmetropolitan 
counties is important in order to avoid selection bias in the results and policy 
implications. 
We also add to the literature by examining multiple dimensions of county fiscal 
decentralization, including fragmentation measures for both general-purpose and single-
purpose governments, county revenue structure, as well as a measure of local home rule   3
power. We also consider the impact of fiscal decentralization on county employment, in 
addition to population and real income, which is new in the literature. 
Finally, we incorporate important spatial relationships into our empirical analysis. 
We apply spatial econometric techniques (Anselin, 1988; Cliff and Ord, 1981) and as a 
result we control for important spillovers from county growth shocks. These spillovers 
may interfere with hypothesis testing, if not properly handled. 
Our results show that government organization matters for local economic 
growth. In addition, the impacts vary by type of government unit and by economic 
indicator. For instance, we find that special-purpose governments have a significant 
impact on population and employment growth, but not on income growth. In contrast, we 
find that county revenue centralization has a significant impact on income growth, but not 
on either population or income growth. These conflicting results across performance 
measures are similar to those encountered by Nelson and Foster (1999) and Foster 
(1993). 
Further, our results also highlight significant differences across metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan counties, which is consistent with recent theoretical results in Brueckner 
(2006) and with the results reported in Lobao and Kraybill (2005). Indeed, we find that 
single-purpose governments more often impact metropolitan growth than 
nonmetropolitan growth, while general-purpose governments impact nonmetropolitan 
growth, in contrast to results for metropolitan counties. 
The complexity of these results suggests that policy makers should be wary of 
claims that any and all forms of fiscal decentralization will enhance growth. Instead, we 
find that particular dimensions of decentralization matter. In addition, we find that   4
decentralization has different impacts across population, employment, and income 
growth, which implies that policy makers should be careful in the claims they make about 
the benefits and costs of changes to local government organization. 
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section provides a review of the 
relevant literature on decentralization and growth.  Section 3 lays out our empirical 
approach and discusses the data used in our regression analysis.  Section 4 presents the 
regression results.  The last section provides our concluding remarks. 
 
2. PREVIOUS STUDIES 
 
Decentralization is seen as an important avenue for efficiency gains by enabling a 
direct link between local provision of services and local tastes (Oates 1972, 1993). It is 
then expected that decentralization helps promote economic growth.  Numerous studies 
examined empirically the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth using data for countries and states.  However, after reviewing a variety of past 
studies on fiscal decentralization and economic growth, Martinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2003) concluded that there is no empirical consensus on this relationship.
2 
The focus on countries (or states within countries) makes sense, in that a state 
which delegates more power to local governments may grow faster than a state which 
retains power centrally. However, this does not capture all dimensions of fiscal 
decentralization, which may also occur at the local level. For instance, Boarnet (1998) 
and Pinto (2007) note there are likely to be spillover effects from decentralization at the 
local level, including activities related to public infrastructure investment and crime 
prevention. They point to the possibility of negative economic impacts from 
decentralization in the presence of local government expenditure spillovers.    5
There have been a number of empirical studies devoted to the impact of local 
government structure on economic growth. Nelson and Foster (1999) and Foster (1993) 
use similar measures of government organization to analyze two different indicators of 
growth (population and income), however, the results for individual indicators tend to be 
different.
3 For instance, central-city population share is positive, but not significant in the 
population regression, but is negative and significant in the income regression. Likewise, 
their measure of special-district fragmentation generates a negative and significant 
correlation with income growth, but a positive and insignificant correlation with 
population growth. Differences across these two measures of economic growth may be 
related to compensating differentials. For example, locations with more favorable 
government structure (e.g. decentralized local governments) may attract residents which 
subsequently drive down wages.
4  
In a more recent study, Stansel (2005) extended the local government empirical 
literature by examining the link between local decentralization and local economic 
growth during the 1960-1990 period, using a new dataset of 314 U.S. metropolitan 
statistical areas.  He found a negative and significant relationship between the central city 
share of metro population and population and real per capita income growth and a 
positive and significant relationship between the number of county governments per 
metropolitan area resident and population and real per capita income growth.  Hence, his 
study shows evidence of a strong positive relationship between local decentralization and 
metropolitan statistical area economic growth.   
Overall, the empirical work focused on local government structure within 
metropolitan areas has highlighted a role for fragmentation measures of decentralization,   6
but the results have tended to vary by measure of decentralization and by economic 
indicator. 
More recently, there have been efforts to model decentralization theoretically.  
Brueckner (1999) showed in an overlapping generations (OLG) model that 
decentralization through young and old jurisdictions affect saving incentives. Brueckner 
(2006) extended this model to show in an endogenous-growth OLG framework that 
changing saving incentives also affect human capital investment and economic growth. In 
this framework, fiscal federalism provides faster economic growth compared to a unitary 
system.  Davoodi and Zou (1998) used a theoretical model similar to Barro (1990) to 
derive growth maximizing budget shares for federal, state and local governments. They 
note that “as long as the actual government budget shares are different from growth-
maximizing shares, the growth rate can always be increased without altering the total 
budget’s share in GDP” (Davoodi and Zou, 1998, p. 247).
5  
These theoretical models have important implications when we compare the 
growth effects of decentralization within different regions.  A good example is a 
comparison between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions within countries.  
Brueckner’s sorting assumption requires the existence of distinct young and old 
populations in each region.   While U.S. metropolitan regions have a rich composition of 
young and old generations, nonmetropolitan regions lack such composition. Hence the 
positive growth results from Brueckner (2006) may not apply to the case of 
decentralization within nonmetropolitan regions that have relatively older and 
homogenous populations (Lobao and Kraybill, 2005). Similarly, growth-maximizing 
budget shares derived by Davoodi and Zou (1998) could be quite different between   7
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions. In line with the Davoodi and Zou framework, 
actual budget shares in those regions could give different growth outcomes.
6 Finally, 
according to theoretical models of Panizza (1999) and Arzhagi and Henderson (2005), we 
would expect greater fiscal centralization in nonmetropolitan regions compared to 
metropolitan regions. This would mean we could get different growth results from 
decentralization within these regions as there may be too much or too little 
decentralization in each of these regions. Lobao and Kraybill (2005) provided a timely 
review of the differences between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan county governments 
in the U.S.  They reported findings from a national survey of county governments. They 
found that nonmetropolitan counties reported greater fiscal stress due to revenue 
requirements of decentralization.  This finding is particularly important since counties 
play an important role in the American federal system in promoting local economic 
development and growth. 
3. EMPIRICAL METHOD AND DATA 
 
We focus on the impact of local decentralization on long-run population, 
employment, and real per capita income growth in both metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan counties. We focus on the 30-year period from 1970 to 2000, because a 
period of this length will likely be long enough to bring long-run issues to the fore. We 
focus on this particular 30-year period in part because it updates previous results in the 
literature (which have previously focused on the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s).  
We operationalize fiscal decentralization in a multi-dimensional way which 
acknowledges the complex nature of the issue. This also allows us to investigate the 
particular types of decentralization which may matter at the county level. We focus   8
exclusively on direct measures of government organization (as opposed to population-
based measures employed by Stansel (2005), Nelson and Foster (1999), and Foster 
(1993)) and we include multiple measures of local government (general purpose and 
single purpose), which allows us to investigate the importance of increased institutional 
decentralization (i.e. more special-purpose governments). We also express our measures 
of local government fragmentation on a per capita and per square mile basis.
7 Similar 
fragmentation measures were used, for example, by Zax (1989) for U.S. counties, Nelson 
(1992) for Swedish local governments and Stansel (2005) for U.S. metropolitan statistical 
areas.  
In general, we interpret an increase in fragmentation as an increase in fiscal 
decentralization. Following Zax (1989) we interpret fragmentation per square mile as 
reflecting the jurisdictional competitiveness across space, with more governments per 
square mile indicating greater competitiveness. Fragmentation per capita reflects the 
relative influence of economies of scale and spillovers versus the ability to meet local 
preferences. 
In addition to these measures we also examine the impact of government revenue 
centralization on growth. We follow Zax (1989) by implementing this measure via the 
ratio of county revenue to total county and local government revenue. This provides an 
indicator of the degree to which both own-source revenue and intergovernmental 
transfers are centralized at the county level and thus provides an indication of 
centralization of economic power in a county. We interpret a decrease in county revenue 
centralization as an increase in fiscal decentralization.   9
We present results for population, employment, and income because these are 
considered important outcome variables by policymakers and because results may differ 
across these indicators. Our results for employment growth are new and add to previous 
results available in the empirical literature on fiscal decentralization. As Glaeser et al. 
(1995) and Beeson et al. (2001) note, income is likely to be a better indicator of economic 
performance for countries than for counties within a nation. This is because residents 
within a nation are likely to move in response to productivity differences (or differences 
in government organization), but population and employment change will in turn affect 
productivity and quality of life. Thus, population and employment may be more 
straightforward indicators of economic performance than income. 
Our approach contributes to the literature, in part, because we are interested in 
exploring these issues for all counties in the lower 48 U.S. states, not just the more 
populous metropolitan statistical areas. This is important, since county and lower levels 
of government are often the governmental units with the power to fragment or centralize, 
either in terms of government units per capita or in terms of revenue generation, in 
contrast to metropolitan statistical areas.
8 This is also important in order to avoid possible 
selection bias in the results and resulting policy implications. As Hammond and 
Thompson (2008) and Higgins et al. (2006) have shown, the impact of growth 
determinants differs significantly across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions. 
Further, nonmetropolitan counties accounted for a significant share of the U.S. population 
in 2004 (at 16.9%, or 49.7 million residents, using the 1999 MSA designations from the 
federal Office of Management and Budget).    10
In addition to measures of local decentralization, we control for other influences 
on long-term growth including local human capital, industry employment mix, labor 
market performance, natural amenities, spatial relationship, the population size of the 
metropolitan area (for metropolitan counties), state fixed effects, previous growth, and 
the initial level of the dependent variable.
 9,10 Our empirical specification is generally 
similar to Glaeser et.al. (1995) and Stansel (2005) in that we use several of the same 
control variables and use beginning period values for all right-hand side variables, in 
order to reduce possible endogeneity between our measures of fiscal decentralization 
(and control variables) and growth. This is likely to be an important issue when analyzing 
the impact of government policies on growth, since government action is by definition 
endogenous and likely to be forward looking.
11 While we do not attempt to instrument 
fiscal decentralization, we do include lagged growth rates (for the preceeding decade) for 
our dependent variables in order to control for the effect of growth on fiscal 
decentralization. Since lagged growth is likely correlated with omitted county fixed 
effects, including it helps to reduce this source of omitted variable bias. 
These formulations are similar to cross-section growth regressions designed to 
provide results on convergence. Under this interpretation, the control variables (with the 
exception of the initial level of the dependent variable) determine the steady state growth 
rate. The initial level variables provide information on the dynamic adjustment to the 
steady state. 
We will identify the impacts of fiscal decentralization on growth by regressing 
population, employment, and real income growth on our measures of fiscal 
decentralization and our control variables. Since we use county-level data, it is important   11
to account for spatial spillovers across counties. These spillovers may be caused by 
commuting connections across counties, which imply that growth shocks to one county 
may be transmitted to other counties nearby, and will cause the residual variance in an 
ordinary least squares regression to be nonspherical. To correct for this, we use a model 
of spatial relationship developed by Anselin (1988): the spatial error model. As Anselin 
(1988) points out, accounting for spatial relationships using the spatial error model will 
improve the efficiency of resulting hypothesis tests. This model has been estimated in a 
variety of contexts, including US state income convergence by Garrett et al. (2007) and 
Rey and Montouri (1999).  
We estimate a spatial error model of the following form, in order to differentiate 
between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan impacts:  
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where y is an Nx1 vector containing the dependent variable, in our case 
population, employment or real income growth rates for N counties. The matrix FDm 
contains our measures of fiscal decentralization for metropolitan counties (FDnm for 
nonmetropolitan counties). The vector (
FD
m β  (
FD
nm β for nonmetropolitan) contains the 
coefficients for metropolitan fiscal decentralization measures. The matrix Xm (Xnm for 
nonmetropolitan) contains our control variables for metropolitan counties. The vectors   12
X
m β  and
X
nm β  contain the coefficients for metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties, 
respectively.  
The matrix W is an NxN row standardized spatial weight matrix (the rows sum to 
one). We choose to model spatial relationships using first-order contiguity, which 
identifies contiguous neighbors. The term ε is an Nx1 vector of errors, and λ is a 
parameter to be estimated that shows the degree of spatial dependence among the error 
terms.  
Use of ordinary least squares on Equations 1 and 2 is not appropriate since the 
spatial error term is non-spherical. However, if ε is homoskedastic and jointly normally 
distributed, the model given by Equations 1 and 2 can be estimated via maximum 
likelihood estimation (Anselin 1988).  
Finally, in order to test the degree of heterogeneity across metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan counties, we carry out spatial Chow tests for structural stability. As 
Anselin (1988, 1990) shows, the test statistic takes the form: 
   () ()() () ) ( ~ /
2 2 K e W I W I e e W I W I e U U R R χ σ λ λ λ λ ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
⎡ − ′ − ′ − − ′ − ′   
where I is the identity matrix, R identifies the restricted regression (all 
coefficients restricted to be equal), U identifies the unrestricted regression (metropolitan 
coefficients differ from nonmetropolitan coefficients), and 
2 σ is the estimate of the error 
variance from the unrestricted regression. 
Our approach utilizes county data for the lower 48 United States.
12 We use the 
1973 metropolitan statistical area definitions which identify 629 counties as metropolitan. 
We are left with 2,443 nonmetropolitan counties. Thus, we classify counties as 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan at the beginning of the period, in order to further   13
reduce issues of selection bias. As Table 1 shows, population and employment growth 
during the 1970-2000 period was much faster on average for metropolitan counties than 
for nonmetropolitan counties. We find a similar pattern in real per capita income growth, 
deflated by the CPI-U, with faster growth in metropolitan counties than in 
nonmetropolitan counties, although the gap is smaller.
13  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Our control variables include the beginning period values for the dependent 
variable, the unemployment rate, educational attainment, employment share (excluding 
agricultural services), the population size of the MSA (excluding the reference county), 
county amenities, and distance to the nearest metropolitan statistical area and incremental 
distances to larger MSAs. As Table 1 shows, the number of residents per county tends to 
be much smaller for nonmetropolitan counties than for their metropolitan counterparts.  
In 1969, real income in metropolitan counties was 26.5% above average income for 
nonmetropolitan counties.  
We account for the local unemployment rate, educational attainment, employment 
mix, population of the metropolitan area (excluding the reference county), county natural 
amenities, and the local spatial hierarchy. We include the natural amenities scale 
developed by McGranahan (1999), where a higher value indicates more desirable natural 
amenity characteristics (such as varied topography, access to water, sunny days in winter, 
warm winter temperatures, temperate summers, and low summer humidity). We account 
for the local spatial hierarchy (along the lines suggested by Partridge et al. (2008)) by 
measuring the distance from a county to the centroid of the closest metropolitan statistical   14
area, as well as incremental distances to larger metropolitan areas. As expected, these 
distances are much shorter for metropolitan counties than for nonmetropolitan counties. 
Our main interest is the impact of fiscal decentralization on growth. Table 1 
summarizes the data on local governments in U.S. counties in 1972. As Table 1 shows, in 
1972 there were 25.9 local governments per county in the United States. Local 
governments include county, municipal, township, independent and dependent school 
districts, and special districts. Metropolitan counties reported a higher number of local 
governments (at 41.5 per county) than did nonmetropolitan counties (at 22.0 per county).  
Metropolitan counties also registered a larger number of government per square mile 
(0.133) than did nonmetropolitan counties (0.084). However, on a per capita basis, 
nonmetropolitan counties registered 176.5 local governments per 100,000 residents, far 
higher than the metropolitan average of 43.2. This pattern reflects the fact that 
nonmetropolitan counties are sparsely populated compared to metropolitan counties. 
Indeed, in 1972, the number of residents per square mile in nonmetropolitan counties was 
77.1, compared to the metropolitan average of 574.5. 
We sum county, municipal, and township governments, as well as dependent 
school systems, to measure general-purpose governments. On average across all U.S. 
counties, general-purpose governments accounted for 50.1% of total local governments in 
1972, at 13.0 per county. General-purpose governments accounted for a larger share of 
governments in nonmetropolitan counties in 1972, at 52.4%, than in metropolitan 
counties, at 45.5%. Similar to results for all local governments, metropolitan counties 
registered more general-purpose governments per county and per square mile, but fewer 
general-purpose governments per capita than nonmetropolitan counties.   15
 We sum independent school districts and special districts to measure single-
purpose governments. On average across all U.S. counties, these governments accounted 
for one-half of total local governments in 1972. These governments account for a larger 
share of local government in metropolitan counties than for nonmetropolitan counties. 
Again, we find that metropolitan counties have more single-purpose governments per 
county and per square mile, but fewer per capita, than do nonmetropolitan counties. 
Special districts accounted for 60.2% of all single-purpose governments in 1972. 
As defined by the Census, special district governments are independent, special-purpose 
governments that exist as separate entities with substantial administrative and financial 
independence from general-purpose local governments. These governments may be 
formed to deliver a variety of goods and services, including infrastructure development, 
water and waste management, parks and recreation, among many others. 
In 1972, the revenue centralism averaged 0.317 across all U.S. counties, which 
implies that on average county governments accounted for 31.7 percent of total county 
and local government revenue. The county revenue ratio was higher in nonmetropolitan 
counties, at 0.321, than in metropolitan counties (0.305).  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Our empirical results for population, employment, and real income growth are 
summarized in Table 2. Results from the spatial Chow test reject the null hypothesis that 
all coefficients are the same across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties at the 1% 
significance level. Thus we report separate results for each.  
 [TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Population Growth   16
We begin by examining results for population growth. First, we note a significant 
positive correlation for single-purpose governments per square mile in metropolitan 
counties and a significant negative correlation for single-purpose governments per capita. 
One way to examine the possible net impact is to consider the growth response to an 
equal percentage increase in single-purpose governments per capita and per square mile. 
A 10% increase in single-purpose governments per capita reduces the long-run growth 
rate by 0.27%, while a 10% increase in single-purpose governments per square mile 
increases long-run growth by 0.17%, which leave the net impact of -0.1%. This suggests 
that increases in single-purpose governments are likely to modestly reduce long-run 
metropolitan growth. In turn, this suggests that spillovers and economies of scale may be 
an important factor in determining the growth impact of special-purpose governments, 
versus the ability to more precisely cater to local tastes and preferences. These results are 
similar to Foster (1993) who found no significant relationship between special district 
dominance, measured as the ratio of special districts to general-purpose governments in a 
metropolitan statistical area, and population growth. 
The results differ for nonmetropolitan counties, with a significant negative 
coefficient on general-purpose governments per capita, which indicates that this form of 
local decentralization is associated with slower nonmetropolitan population growth. The 
estimated coefficients imply that a 10% increase in general-purpose governments per 
capita are associated with a 0.36% decrease in long-run nonmetropolitan population 
growth. We find no significant correlation for single-purpose governments per capita (or 
square mile), in contrast to our results for metropolitan counties.    17
Since single-purpose governments include both independent school districts and 
special districts, we further decompose single-purpose governments and present our 
regression results in Table 3. We find a significant positive correlation on metropolitan 
special districts per square mile (significant at the 1% level). Again, the coefficients 
special-purpose governments for nonmetropolitan counties are not significantly different 
from zero, indicating important differences across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
counties. 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Overall, our results for population growth suggest that fiscal decentralization may 
modestly reduce long-run population growth in both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
counties, but for different reasons. We find that special-purpose governments have a 
significant impact for metropolitan counties, while general-purpose governments have a 
significant impact on nonmetropolitan county growth.  
Employment Growth 
We find a significant correlation for metropolitan special-purpose governments 
per square mile (and special districts per square mile), similar to our results for 
population growth. Our estimates imply that a 10% increase in special-purpose 
governments per capita increase long-run metropolitan employment growth by 0.1%. For 
nonmetropolitan counties, we again find a significant negative correlation for general-
purpose government fragmentation and a significantly positive correlation for single-
purpose governments per capita, with the results driven by school district fragmentation 
per capita (this variable is significant at the 11% level). Our elasticity estimates suggest 
that a 10% increase in general-purpose governments per capita would decrease   18
nonmetropolitan employment growth by 0.23%, while a 10% increase in single-purpose 
governments per capita would increase employment growth by 0.15%. Thus, the net 
impact suggests that fiscal decentralization may have a negative impact on 
nonmetropolitan employment growth. 
Overall, the results show differences across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan 
counties, with general-purpose government fragmentation negatively correlated with 
nonmetropolitan growth, while we find no significant correlation with metropolitan 
growth. Further, single-purpose governments per capita are positively correlated with 
nonmetropolitan employment growth but single-purpose governments per square mile are 
positively correlated with metropolitan employment growth.  
These results suggest that increasing fragmentation of special-purpose 
governments can boost employment growth, which may reflect the added institutional 
decentralization afforded by relying on this type of service delivery. Our results suggest 
that this type of institutional flexibility matters more for labor market outcomes than for 
residential choices. Further, the reason that special-purpose governments matter for 
employment growth likely differ across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions. For 
instance, we find a positive correlation between special-purpose governments per square 
mile and employment growth in metropolitan counties. This suggests that it may be the 
competitive pressures of many special-purpose governments (mainly special-districts) 
within the county that drives government efficiency which ultimately benefits 
employment growth. For nonmetropolitan counties, we find that it is special-purpose 
governments (mainly school districts) per capita that is positively correlated with 
employment growth. This suggests that it is the ability to better reflect local tastes and   19
preferences (versus economies of scale and efficiency) that affects local employment 
growth. 
Income Growth 
We find that revenue centralization is positively correlated with long-run income 
growth in metropolitan counties, but no correlation between any of our measures of 
decentralization and nonmetropolitan income growth. Our estimates imply that a 10% 
increase in revenue centralization in metropolitan counties generates a decline in long-run 
per capita income growth of 0.28%. This suggests that metropolitan fiscal 
decentralization, of this form, benefits long-run income growth. It also suggests that 
generating revenue in a decentralized way makes the county a more attractive location for 
high income individuals and activities. 
Results for Control Variables 
Results for the control variables in metropolitan counties are generally similar to 
those in Glaeser et.al. (1995) and Stansel (2005) and other results in the literature. We 
find a negative and significant coefficient on initial population, employment, and income 
(in their respective regressions), for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. 
This suggests that counties with initially high levels in 1970 tended to grow slower than 
counties with low levels in 1970.
14  
We find a positive and significant correlation between initial educational 
attainment and income growth for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties, 
similar to Hammond and Thompson (2008) and Higgins et al. (2006).  For 
nonmetropolitan counties, we find a positive and significant correlation for the 
unemployment rate for population and employment growth, which suggests that   20
nonmetropolitan counties with greater labor market slack tend to grow faster. Deller, et 
al. (2001) report a similar result for the impact of the unemployment rate on population 
growth in nonmetropolitan counties.  
We also find that metropolitan counties which are part of more populous 
metropolitan areas tend to generate faster income growth and that higher levels of natural 
amenities are associated with faster income growth for both metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan counties (and faster population and employment growth for 
metropolitan counties). We also report results for spatial hierarchy that are similar to 
Partridge et al. (2008), in that counties that are closer to larger metropolitan areas 
generally tend to grow faster. 
Finally, we find significant positive spillovers of growth shocks (λ positive and 
significantly different from zero) across counties. This suggests that counties whose 
neighbors grow faster than expected also tend to grow faster than expected. 
We have included state binary variables in our regressions to control for state 
policies. However, one aspect of state policymaking affects the degree to which local 
governments are allowed to control their own destiny. The home rule index introduced by 
Geon and Turnbull (2006) and updated by Salvino (2007) presents a way to control for 
this aspect of state policy. This measure relies on the detailed political, economic, and 
legal information summarized in Krane, et al. (2001) on the freedom granted to local 
governments by the state authority. This is a multi-dimensional concept that considers the 
degree to which local governments are allowed to raise and spend revenue, as well as 
independently undertake other government functions. It is important to keep in mind that 
the state policies might have evolved during the 1970-2000 period, and so this measure   21
might not be ideal. However, it is the best measure we know of at this time. The index is 
an ordinal measure ranging from 1.0 to 4.0, with a score of 1.0 given to states which 
allocate to local governments the least decision making power and a score of 4.0 given to 
state’s which grant the most freedom to local governments.  We assign the state score to 
each county within the state and replace state binary variables with Census division 
binary variables. All other fiscal decentralization and control variables are the same. Our 
results suggest that greater home rule powers positively impact population and 
employment growth for nonmetropolitan counties, but do not have a statistically 
significant impact on growth in metropolitan counties.
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5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, we find a great deal of heterogeneity in the impact of various forms 
of fiscal decentralization across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties and across 
measures of local economic performance. In general, our results suggest that policy 
makers should also take care to think through not only the form of decentralization being 
considered, but also the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan character of the county and the 
goals which are meant to be achieved, because there is likely to be significant 
heterogeneity in the response to any given policy change.  
We find that the growth impacts of fiscal decentralization differ across 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties. Similar to Stansel (2005), we find evidence 
that decentralization may contribute to metropolitan growth, particularly for employment 
and income growth (where we find that increased fragmentation of single-purpose 
governments boosts employment growth, while reduced revenue centralization increases 
income growth). In contrast, we find that general-purpose government fragmentation is   22
negatively associated with population and employment growth in nonmetropolitan 
counties. These results are consistent with new results in the theoretical literature, which 
suggest that fiscal decentralization may be of less benefit to the less demographically 
diverse nonmetropolitan counties. In turn, our results suggest that policy makers should 
take into account the metropolitan/nonmetropolitan character of their county when 
considering possible costs/benefits of local fiscal decentralization.  
We also find that the particular form of fiscal decentralization has heterogeneous 
impacts on economic indicators that matter to local policymakers. For instance, we find 
that special-purpose governments on balance tend to reduce metropolitan population 
growth, while special-purpose governments per square mile increase employment growth 
and have no significant impact on real income growth in metropolitan counties. For 
nonmetropolitan counties, increases in general-purpose governments per capita tends to 
reduce population and employment growth, but has no significant impact on income 
growth. These conflicting results between population (and employment) and income 
growth are similar to those encountered by Nelson and Foster (1999) and Foster (1993) 
and can arise from compensating wage differentials driven by increased migration into 
the county in response to government organization. 
In addition, we find that fragmentation of special-purpose governments may spur 
employment growth for both metropolitan and nonmetropolitan counties, which may 
reflect the added institutional decentralization created by relying on this method of 
service delivery. Finally, our results highlight the importance of accounting for spatial 
relationships in the US county data. We find significant spillovers of growth shocks from 
county neighbors that should be accounted for in studies of local economic growth.   23
  Among possible future extensions of this research, we note that it may be useful 
to examine the same relationship by including the time dimension.  Hence, a panel data 
analysis would enable us to examine both the variations in the number of local 
government units across metropolitan and nonmetropolitan regions and also variation 
across time in these regions. In addition, an analysis of counties that have engaged in 
significant fiscal consolidation or decentralization using quasi-experimental techniques 
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TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for U.S. Counties 
    Mean Values 
Variable  Sources  All  Metro
a  Nonmetro 
Population Growth 1970-2000 (%)  Census  42.954  73.807  35.010 
Employment Growth 1970-2000 (%)  Census  82.941  129.353  70.991 
RPCI Growth 1969-1999 (%)  Census Real Money Income Per Capita  62.598  63.576  62.346 
Population Growth 1960-1970 (%)  Census  5.434  22.105  1.142 
Employment Growth 1960-1970 (%)  Census  10.699  29.792  5.783 
Income Growth 1959-1969 (%)  Census Real Money Income Per Capita  45.797  39.534  47.409 
Total Local Govts 1972  Census of Govt., CGF
d  25.876  41.496  21.975 
     Per 100k Residents  Census of Govt., CGF, 1970 population  149.220  43.181  176.522 
     Per Square Mile  Census of Govt., CGF  0.094  0.133  0.084 
General Purpose Govts 1972
b  Census of Govt. CGF  12.971  18.890  11.447 
     Per 100k Residents  Census of Govt., CGF, 1970 population  75.877  22.203  89.696 
     Per Square Mile  Census of Govt., CGF  0.052  0.073  0.047 
Single Purpose Govts 1972
c  Census of Govt., CGF  12.905  22.606  10.407 
     Per 100k Residents  Census of Govt., CGF, 1970 population  73.343  20.977  86.826 
          School Districts  Census of Govt., CGF, 1970 population  32.499  8.029  38.800 
          Special Districts  Census of Govt., CGF, 1970 population  40.844  12.948  48.026 
     Per Square Mile  Census of Govt., CGF  0.042  0.060  0.037 
          School Districts  Census of Govt., CGF  0.019  0.033  0.016 
          Special Districts  Census of Govt., CGF  0.022  0.027  0.021 
County Revenue Ratio, 1972  Census of Govt., CGF, defined in text  0.317  0.305  0.321 
Population (000) 1970  Census  63.727  225.778  22.004 
Employment (000) 1970  Census  23.986  87.270  7.718 
Real Per Capita Money Income 1969  Census Real Money Income Per Capita  2.409  2.891  2.285 
     (000), $1969             
Unemployment Rate 1970  Census, City and County Databook, 1972  0.045  0.041  0.046 
MSA Pop. (000) 1970, Excl. County  Author Calculations  141.437  690.772  0.000 
Mining Employment Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.024  0.010  0.028 
Construction Employment Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.056  0.058  0.055 
Manufacturing Employment Share, 1970  U.S. BE, Author Calculations  0.192  0.223  0.184 
Trade, Trans. Util. Empl. Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.049  0.050  0.049 
Wholesale Trade Empl. Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.030  0.035  0.028 
Retail Trade Empl. Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.178  0.163  0.182 
Fin., Ins., R.E. Empl. Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.055  0.060  0.053 
Services Employment Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.184  0.182  0.184 
Government Employment Share, 1970  U.S. BEA, Author Calculations  0.219  0.209  0.222 
Percent of Pop 25+ with   U.S. Census Bureau  0.073  0.098  0.066 
               16+ Yrs. Schooling 1970             
Natural Amenities Scale   USDA, Economic Research Service  0.054  0.253  0.003 
Distance To Own MSA, KM  Computed by authors  5.090  24.859  0.000 
Distance To MSA, KM  Computed by authors  88.438  0.000  111.208 
Incr. Dist. To MSA: Pop> 250k in 1970  Computed by authors  54.720  34.804  59.848 
Inc. Dist. To MSA: Pop> 500k in 1970  Computed by authors  44.132  38.864  45.489 
Incr. Dist. To MSA: Pop> 1,500k in 1970  Computed by authors  190.312  165.537  196.691 
ametropolitan areas as defined by OMB in 1973. 
bIncludes county, municipal, township governments and dependent school 
systems. 
cIncludes independent school systems and special districts. 
dCGF is the Compendium of Government Finances.      28
TABLE 2: General-Purpose and Single-Purpose Government Regressions   
   Population 70-00  Employment 70-00  Real Income 70-00   
   Metro  Nonmetro  Metro  Nonmetro  Metro  Nonmetro   
   Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.   
   Fiscal Decentralization                     
     GP Govt. Per Capita  0.00005  -0.0001+  -0.0003  -0.0002^  0.0001  0.00002   
     GP Govt. Per Sqmi  -0.0998  0.0056  -0.1009  0.0205  -0.0149  0.0030   
     SP Govt. Per Capita  -0.0010*  -0.0001  -0.0008  0.0001*  -0.0004  -0.00001   
     SP Govt. Per Sqmi  0.2086*  0.0225  0.2189*  -0.0021  0.0339  0.0009   
     County Revenue Ratio  0.0278  -0.0265  -0.0165  -0.0505  -0.0579*  -0.0272   
   Control Variables                    
     ln Population 1970  -0.1394^  -0.0351^  --  --  -0.0248^  -0.0161^   
     ln Employment 1970  --  --  -0.1899^  -0.0322^  --  --   
     ln Per Capita Inc. 1969  -0.3980^  0.0538  -0.3183^  0.0473  -0.4353^  -0.5226^   
     Pop. Gr.: 1960-1970  1.0383^  0.9367^  --  --  --  --   
     Emp. Gr.: 1960-1970  --  --  0.9859^  0.7100^  --  --   
     Real Per Cap. Inc. Gr.: 1959-69  --  --  --  --  0.4275^  -0.0840^   
     ln MSA Pop.  1970, Ex. County  0.0042  --  0.0069  --  0.0102^  --   
     Unemp. Rate 1970  -4.1864^  0.7261^  -1.2396  1.5014^  -2.2398^  -0.8186^   
     Mining Shr. 1970  -2.9840^  -0.5171+  -2.1630^  -0.5874  -0.3328+  -0.0026   
     Construction Shr. 1970  -1.4981^  0.0736  -0.4416*  0.3434  0.2683  0.3817^   
     Manufacturing Shr. 1970  -2.4960^  -0.1828  -1.8140^  -0.2826  -0.3408^  0.0330   
      Trade, Trans., Util. Shr. 1970  -2.7194^  -0.2791  -2.1305^  -0.3245  -0.4228^  -0.0614   
     Wholesale Trade Shr. 1970  -2.4076^  -0.7201^  -1.4500+  -0.5542+  -0.3034  -0.0040   
     Retail Trade Shr. 1970  -2.6933^  0.2195  -1.9909^  0.1158  -0.5021^  -0.0956   
     Fin., Ins., R.E. Shr. 1970  -0.5919  0.6450^  0.4140  1.0107^  0.2180  0.6729^   
     Services Shr. 1970  -2.5948^  0.2693  -2.1241^  0.0958  -0.0418  0.1643^   
     Govt. Shr. 1970  -2.8530^  -0.1176  -1.8401^  0.1904  -0.3151^  -0.0055   
     Ed. Att. 1970  0.3643  -0.4835+  0.8605+  -0.0815  0.9071^  0.4099^   
     Amenities Scale  0.0022  0.0370^  0.0127  0.0406^  0.0202^  0.0148^   
     Min. Dist. Own MSA  0.0010  --  0.0002  --  -0.0004  --   
     Min. Dist To MSA  --  -0.0011^  --  -0.0013^  --  -0.0005^   
     Incr. Dist. MSA >250k Pop.  -0.0005+  -0.0007^  -0.0008^  -0.0009^  -0.0004^  -0.0004^   
     Incr. Dist. MSA >500k Pop.  -0.0001  -0.0002*  -0.0003  -0.0003+  -0.0003^  -0.0002^   
     Incr. Dist. MSA >1500k Pop.  0.0001  0.00001  0.0002  -0.00002  -0.0001+  -0.0001^   
     Constant  4.8475^  0.6634+  4.4086^  0.6990*  1.3365^  1.1291^   
λ  0.4900^  0.4890^  0.3480^   
State Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes   
Obs.  3072  3072  3072   
Adj. R-Squared  0.6929  0.6471  0.5955   
Akaike Information Criterion  -2.9774  -2.7220  -4.4729   
Schwartz Criterion  -2.6967  -2.4413  -4.1922   
Log-Likelihood  1347.09  956.55  3687.50   
*, +,^ indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. GP is general purpose and 
SP is single purpose.    
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TABLE 3: Disaggregated Single-Purpose Government Regressions 
   Population 70-00     Employment 70-00     Real Income 69-99  
   Metro  Nonmetro     Metro  Nonmetro     Metro  Nonmetro 
   Coeff.  Coeff.     Coeff.  Coeff.     Coeff.  Coeff. 
   Fiscal Decentralization                         
     GP Govt. Per Capita  0.00001  -0.0001+     -0.00037  -0.0002^     0.00018  0.00002 
     GP Govt. Per Sqmi  -0.0602  0.0131     -0.0584  0.0281     -0.0187  0.0066 
        Sp. Dist. Per Capita  -0.0009  0.0000     -0.0008  0.0001     -0.0004  -0.00002 
        Sch. Dist. Per Capita  -0.0016  -0.0001     -0.0007  0.0001     -0.0007  -0.00001 
        Sp. Dist. Per Square Mile  0.5722^  0.0448     0.6083^  0.0230     -0.0094  0.0106 
        Sch. Dist. Per Square Mile  0.1127  -0.0173     0.1149  -0.0438     0.0431  -0.0143 
     County Revenue Ratio  0.0380  -0.0262     -0.0073  -0.0520     -0.0584*  -0.0274 
   Control Variables                         
     ln Population 1970  -0.1460^  -0.0345^     --  --     -0.0244^  -0.0163^ 
     ln Employment 1970  --  --     -0.1959^  -0.0329^     --  -- 
     ln Per Capita Inc. 1969  -0.3971^  0.0523     -0.3198^  0.0490     -0.4337^  -0.5217^ 
     Pop. Gr.: 1960-70  1.0389^  0.9389^     --  --     --  -- 
     Emp. Gr.: 1960-70  --  --     0.9851^  0.7085^     --  -- 
     Real Per Cap. Inc. Gr.: 1959-69  --  --     --  --     0.4287^  -0.0835^ 
     ln MSA Pop., 1970, Ex. County  0.0056        0.0083        0.0101^    
     Unemp. Rate 1970  -4.1441^  0.7241^     -1.2662  1.5046^     -2.2239^  -0.8166^ 
     Mining Shr. 1970  -2.8446^  -0.5116*     -2.0242^  -0.5922*     -0.3417+  -0.0020 
     Construction Shr. 1970  -1.3413^  0.0803     -0.2660  0.3348     0.2472  0.3814^ 
     Manufacturing Shr. 1970  -2.3535^  -0.1795     -1.6558^  -0.2900     -0.3595^  0.0328 
      Trade, Trans., Util. Shr. 1970  -2.5697^  -0.2786     -1.9617^  -0.3292     -0.4425^  -0.0613 
     Wholesale Trade Shr. 1970  -2.2024^  -0.7147^     -1.2128*  -0.5610+     -0.3324  -0.0064 
     Retail Trade Shr. 1970  -2.5328^  0.2253     -1.8380^  0.1142     -0.5104^  -0.0955 
     Fin., Ins., R.E. Shr. 1970  -0.4431  0.6580^     0.5632  0.9958^     0.2048  0.6715^ 
     Services Shr. 1970  -2.4738^  0.2736     -1.9809^  0.0914     -0.0610  0.1650^ 
     Govt. Shr. 1970  -2.7183^  -0.1091     -1.6925^  0.1841     -0.3322^  -0.0059 
     Ed. Att. 1970  0.3901  -0.4830+     0.8902+  -0.0786     0.9038^  0.4106^ 
     Amenities Scale  0.0025  0.0369^     0.0130  0.0404^     0.0202^  0.0148^ 
     Min. Dist. Own MSA  0.0009  --     0.0001  --     -0.0004  -- 
     Min. Dist To MSA  --  -0.0011^     --  -0.0013^     --  -0.0005^ 
     Incr. Dist. MSA >250k Pop.  -0.0005^  -0.0007^     -0.0008^  -0.0009^     -0.0004^  -0.0004^ 
     Incr. Dist. MSA >500k Pop.  -0.00003  -0.0002*     -0.0002  -0.0003+     -0.0004^  -0.0002^ 
     Incr. Dist. MSA >1500k Pop.  0.0001  0.00001     0.0002  -0.00002     -0.0001+  -0.0001^ 
     Constant  4.7653^  0.6524+     4.3058^  0.7117*     1.3481^  1.1304^ 
λ  0.4930^    0.4950^    0.3430^ 
State Fixed Effects  Yes     Yes     Yes 
Obs.  3072     3072     3072 
Adj. R-Squared  0.6934     0.6477     0.5948 
Akaike Information Criterion  -2.9769     -2.7227     -4.4702 
Schwartz Criterion  -2.6884     -2.4342     -4.1817 
Log-Likelihood  1350.30     959.21     3687.93 
*, **, *** indicate significance (two-tailed) at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively            30
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 A report by the NCSL (1997: 3-5) shows this in terms of the percent of state and local 
tax revenue raised by state governments. Brunori (2003) provides a detailed review of the 
role property taxation in local fiscal autonomy. 
2 For instance, Davoodi and Zou (1998), Zhang and Zou (1998), Xie, Zou, and Davoodi 
(1999) found a negative relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth using 
data sets based on panels of developed countries, Chinese provinces, and U.S. states, 
during the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s. Other studies conflict with these findings by 
showing evidence of a positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth.   For example, Lin and Liu (2000) using Chinese provinces and Akai and Sakata 
(2002) using U.S. states. 
3 These studies utilize measures of government structure that include population-based 
measures of central-city dominance and municipal fragmentation, as well as measure of 
special-purpose government fragmentation per capita and special-purpose governments 
relative to total governments in the metropolitan area. 
4 Roback (1982) developed a model of compensating differentials in labor markets and 
showed evidence that local amenities can explain regional wage differences. 
5 Similarly, Panizza (1999), and Arzhagi and Henderson (2005) examined determinants 
of fiscal federalism by developing models of welfare maximizing decentralization (or 
centralization in the case of Panizza, 1999). 
6 These papers show that fiscal decentralization increases with population size and 
heterogeneity, which are factors that enhance taste differentiation. 
7 There may be some concern about collinearity between the per capita measures and the 
per square mile measures, however, the correlation coefficients tend to be small, varying 
from +0.03 for general-purpose governments to +0.04 for single-purpose governments.   31
                                                                                                                                                 
8 Metropolitan statistical areas are designated by the federal Office of Management and 
Budget to reflect sub-state local labor market areas. They do not generally conform to 
political jurisdictions. 
9 For our state fixed effects, Alabama is the excluded state for both metropolitan and 
nonmetropolitan regions. We also drop nonmetropolitan binary variables for Rhode 
Island and the District of Columbia because they contained no nonmetropolitan counties 
in 1973. Similarly, we drop metropolitan binary variables for Vermont and Wyoming 
since they contained no metropolitan counties. 
10 For our industry employment shares, we exclude Agricultural Services from the 
regression to avoid perfect collinearity. 
11 We also run our model for counties that were nonmetropolitan in 1973 but changed 
status to metropolitan by 2003. The results are qualitatively similar to those for all 
nonmetropolitan counties. Thus, we do not find much evidence that nonmetropolitan 
counties were designing decentralization policy in anticipation of metropolitan status. 
12 We treat independent cities as county equivalents. 
13 Our indicator of income comes from the Census Bureau, which measures money 
income. This measure reflects income flows by place of residence from a variety of 
sources, including earnings from work, asset income, and transfers. However, it differs 
significantly from personal income, measure by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
in that it excludes payments in kind (such as food stamps, Medicare, and Medicaid 
payments). 
14 The coefficient on initial population (income), which is commonly referred to as the 
conditional convergence coefficient, must be interpreted carefully as Quah (1993) has 
forcefully argued. In particular, Quah (1993) shows that a significant negative coefficient 
on initial income in a cross-section growth regression does not imply that income levels   32
                                                                                                                                                 
are becoming more similar during the estimation period. We do not place the 
convergence interpretation on the coefficient of initial population (income). Rather we 
view it as indicating that initially lower income areas have tended to grow faster than 
initially higher income areas, after accounting for steady-state determinants, which is 
what we observe. 
15 These results are available from the authors upon request. 